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STATE OF UTAH etal., 
Respondents/Appellees. 
Case No. 20080748-CA 
Appeal from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Presiding 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final order entered by the Third Judicial District Court 
on August 21, 2008, R. 304-11 (Add. A), dismissing with prejudice petitioner's Amended 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief, brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. R. 2-6. Petitioner, 
a sex offender confined to the Utah State Prison, alleged that respondents were 
wrongfully restraining him in violation of his rights under the federal and state 
constitutions and state statutes. Following entry of the court's order of dismissal, 
petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on August 27, 2008. R. 315-17. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f) (West Supp. 2008) gives this Court jurisdiction over the appeal 
from the district court's order on the petition for extraordinary writ. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Because petitioner challenged the actions of the Board of Pardons, the district 
court correctly considered the petition under Utah R. Civ. P. 654B(d)(2)(D). 
2. The district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, the undisputed facts 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
3. The district court correctly concluded that the tolling of petitioner's sentence 
during his incarceration on federal charges did not violate the prohibition against ex post 
facto laws or other constitutional provisions. 
4* The district court correctly ruled that the Board of Pardons1 issuance of a retaking 
warrant did not exceed its constitutional authority and that the signed warrant request was 
appropriately certified under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) (West 2004). 
S« The order prepared by respondents' attorney and issued by the district court judge 
correctly stated the district court's rulings. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
The petition in this case was filed on October 16, 2007. R. 2-6 (petition), 7-29 
(supporting memorandum). In a Memorandum Decision and Order entered October 22, 
2007, the district court judge dismissed the petition without prejudice. R. 39-40. 
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Following three motions to extend time, R. 46-49, 63-65, and 74-76, petitioner filed an 
amended petition, R. 83-113, alleging that the Board of Pardons (Board) had violated his 
constitutional rights by (1) extending his sentence through tolling during the time he was 
paroled to federal custody, (2) seizing him on his release from parole to federal custody, 
(3) issuing a retaking warrant on the basis of an uncertified warrant request, and (4) 
incarcerating him beyond the time calculated from the Utah Sentencing Guidelines 
matrix. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, R. 217-18, supported by a memorandum, 
R. 140-216. The district court granted the motion from the bench on July 30, 2008, and 
ordered counsel for respondents to prepare an order. R. 297. Over petitioner's objections, 
R. 300-03, the judge signed respondents1 proposed order on August 21, 2008, R. 304-10, 
noting and overruling the objections. R. 310. Five days later, petitioner filed a timely 
notice of appeal. R. 315-16. 
It, Statement of Relevant Facts 
On or about May 18, 1990, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a 
child, a second degree felony, and was sentenced to a term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years. R. 141, 155, 305. He was paroled effective March 28, 1995, 
R. 141,157, 305, but was returned to prison as the result of a Board warrant dated 
December 4, 1995. R. 141, 161,305. He was paroled a second time on May 14,1996, 
R. 141,163, 305, and was again returned to prison on a Board warrant dated June 12, 
1998. R. 141,167,305. On July 27,2001, a federal detainer was lodged against 
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petitioner. R. 141, 305.l Petitioner was paroled to federal authorities for disposition of 
the detainer effective April 2,2002. R. 141,171,305. In reporting the results of the 
Special Attention Review establishing this parole date, the Board explicitly noted that 
,f[t]ime on Utah's sentence will toll while Mr. Tucker is in Federal custody." R. 171; see 
also R. 141, 305. On July 20, 2001, judgment was entered against petitioner on a federal 
criminal charge of possession of child pornography, and he was sentenced to five years of 
confinement followed by three years of supervised release. R. 141,173, 305. 
Petitioner was returned to state custody on August 9, 2006, and was placed in the 
Bonneville Community Correctional Center (BCCC) for completion of a sex offender 
program. R. 142, 180, 305. On September 12,2006, he admitted to BCCC staff that he 
had accessed child pornography while in federal custody and had brought cartoon-like 
"anime" images of young girls in the nude to BCCC. R. 142, 187, 306. Investigators 
conducted a search of his former room at the federal halfway house and discovered three 
computer disks containing pornographic cartoon images and photographs of female 
children in provocative poses. R. 142, 180, 186, 306. Based on the disks and on 
petitioner's failure to complete the sex offender program, the Board issued a retaking 
warrant on September 15, 2008. R. 142, 190, 306„ Petitioner initially pled not guilty to 
violating his parole agreement, but, in a subsequent letter to the Board, withdrew his 
*By clerical error, Exhibit #6 (R. 169) to respondents1 memorandum supporting the 
motion to dismiss is a 1998 federal detainer. Plaintiff has not disputed the fact of his parole to 
federal authorities under the 2001 detainer. 
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denial of and accepted responsibility for the charged violations; he also waived his right 
to an evidentiary hearing before the Board. R. 142,192, 306. 
Petitioner's sentence will expire on May 29, 2009. Hrg. DVD at 9:24:13-23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The petition in this case challenges the actions of the Board of Pardons as 
exceeding the Board's jurisdiction or conflicting with constitutional and statutory law. 
Such claims are expressly governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(D). Petitioner admits 
that his petition is based on an alleged misapplication of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202-a 
provision that explicitly addresses the discretion of the Board of Pardons.2 See Aplt. 
Brief at 7a. He provides no authority to support his contention that his case should be 
decided under subsection (b) of the rule, as a wrongful restraint on personal liberty. His 
preference for the remedies provided in subsection (b) is an insufficient basis on which to 
recharacterize his claims. Moreover, his four-sentence argument on this point, lacking 
any citation to relevant case law, is inadequate briefing of the issue under Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). 
In ruling on the amended petition, the district court applied the correct test for a 
motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): whether, accepting the facts alleged, 
2This Court decided the same claim against petitioner in a prior case, Tucker v. 
State, 2003 UT App 213,2003 WL 21469154. Petitioner did not argue ex post facto 
application of the relevant statute until that case was on appeal, and the Court declined to 
consider the issue as untimely raised. Because he could and should have raised the issue 
for timely consideration in the prior case, claim preclusion can be applied to bar its 
consideration here, as respondents argued in the district court. See R. 142-44. 
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petitioner has a right to relief based on those facts. Petitioner has identified no fact that 
the district court failed to accept as alleged. Instead, he argues that the court improperly 
entertained questions of law in considering the petition. See Aplt. Brief at 8. But 
precedent makes clear that the court need not accept petitioner's view of the law in 
making that assessment. 
Applying the law to the facts as alleged, the district court correctly concluded that 
the tolling of petitioner's sentence during his confinement on federal charges did not 
violate his constitutional rights and was within the Board's authority. Rather than 
showing error in the district court's analysis, petitioner simply repeats the arguments the 
court rejected. He presents no authority contradicting the court's conclusions that (1) the 
Board was within its authority to toll the sentence, and (2) the tolling did not increase 
petitioner's punishment in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
Petitioner's representation that the district court did not conclude, in the July 30, 
2008 hearing, that the signatures on the warrant request met the statutory certification 
requirement (see Aplt. Brief at 2-3) is belied by the recording of the hearing that 
petitioner moved this Court to admit as a part of the record on appeal. Moreover, as 
petitioner concedes, he pleaded "no contest" to the Board's revocation allegations. Aplt. 
Brief at 6. By doing so, he waived any nonjurisdictional irregularities in the revocation 
process, as the district court judge agreed. See Hrg. DVD at 9:21:54 - 9:22:08. 
Finally, the district court did not err in signing the order prepared at the -court's 
request by counsel for the Board. The court ordered counsel to prepare an order setting 
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forth the court's ruling. See Hrg. DVD at 9:25:29-36; R. 297. Once the order was 
submitted to the court, petitioner filed his objections to it. R. 300-03. As signed by the 
court on August 21, 2008, the order notes and overrules petitioner's objections, R. 310, 
and clarifies that the facts provided in the order are not findings, but the factual history of 
the case. R. 305. Petitioner has cited no authority for his contention that the practice of 
ordering the prevailing party to prepare an order reflecting the court's ruling is in any way 
improper. 
Because petitioner has failed to demonstrate error in the district court's order, there 
are no grounds to disturb it. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review: A motion to dismiss "presents a question of law that we 
review for correctness. Moreover, the district court's inteipretation of prior precedent, 
statutes, and the common law are questions of law that we review for correctness." Ellis 
v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, H 6, 169 P.3d 441. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED THE 
PETITION UNDER RULE 65B(d)(2)(D) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Petitioner asserts that the district court erroneously failed to consider his petition 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b). Subsection (b) of the rule governs wrongful restraints on 
personal liberty. After reviewing the amended petition, the district court ruled that, 
because the petition alleged improprieties by the Board of Pardons, it would consider the 
petition under subsection (d)(2)(D) of the rule, which explicitly governs claims that "the 
7 
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded it jurisdiction or failed to perform an act 
required by constitutional or statutory law." In so ruling, the court observed that the 
application of subsection (d)(2)(D) was warranted because "the gravamen of Mr. Tucker's 
petition seems to be that the Board of Pardons denied him due process by exceeding its 
powers under the Constitution and by illegally extending his sentence beyond the stated 
expiration date." R. 126. 
Petitioner's argument on this point, contained in its entirety on the unnumbered 
page between pages 7 and 8 of his brief, demonstrates the correctness of the district 
court's decision. Petitioner asserts that the Board's application of Utah Code Aim. 
§ 76-3-202(8) illegally lengthened his sentence, making his arrest on a Board warrant 
during the allegedly illegal extension a wrongful restraint on his personal liberty. Absent 
the Board's allegedly illegal actions, petitioner would not have a claim. Because, as the 
court correctly determined, petitioner's claims are based on actions of the Board that 
allegedly violated its constitutional and statutory powers, consideration of the petition 
under subsection (d)(2)(D) was not only proper, but required by precedent. In a similar 
case, an inmate sought post-conviction relief under two subsections of Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B as well as Rule 65C. This Court observed that despite the petitioner's argument that 
the district court had applied the wrong provision, "the district court appropriately 
analyzed the petition for its substance, rather than its caption." Glasscock v. State, 2005 
UT App 12,2005 WL 67583 at *1 n.2. See also Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 
904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995) ("Petitions for writs of habeas corpus under [former] Rule 
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65B(c)[governing "[ojther wrongful restraints on personal liberty"] cannot be used to 
challenge Board actions that might be challenged under [former] Rule 65B(e) [now Rule 
65B(d)(2)(D)].);" Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 
1997) (quoting Renn); Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, f 20 n.5, 89 P.3d 196 (citing 
Padilla). 
Because petitioner has failed to show that the district court's application of 
subsection (d)(2)(D) was erroneous, there is no reason to disturb its ruling on this issue. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL 
STANDARD IN RULING THAT THE PETITION FAILED TO STATE A 
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 
Petitioner argues that the district court erred by failing to conclude that the petition 
alleged sufficient facts to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. However, many of 
the "facts" he asserts the court disregarded are not facts at all, but petitioner's legal 
conclusions. On appeal, "a court need not accept conclusory allegations made in the 
complaint as true," including conclusions of law. Cline v. Brown, 2008 UT App 319, f 2, 
2008 WL 3975624. 
As "facts" that the district court declined to accept, petitioner lists issues of law: 
that the Utah Constitution places limitations on the Board's powers; that the legislature 
unconstitutionally gave the Board powers properly belonging to Article VIII courts, in 
violation of Article Vfs separation of powers; and that applying the Board's legislatively 
derived powers to petitioner violated petitioner's due process rights because the powers 
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themselves are unconstitutional. See Aplt. Brief at 3.3 To the extent that he makes any 
challenge to the factual history contained in the district court's order elsewhere in his 
brief, he does not show how any challenged fact contradicts the facts as alleged in his 
petition or affects the court's analysis. Instead, he seeks only to provide an explanatory 
context for certain facts to fit his legal theory that the Board acted in violation of his 
rights. See Aplt. Brief at 19-22. 
Forcing the district court to accept petitioner's conclusions of law would deprive it 
of its rightful role in assessing the sufficiency of the petition. The court must "first 
examine the applicable law" to determine whether the facts alleged meet the elements of a 
claim under the provisions of law invoked. Wliipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 
P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). As petitioner acknowledges, "he js just a layman at law" 
who "has not had the benefit of years of training and practice" in legal tasks. Aplt. Brief 
at 16. As such, he is not in the court's advantaged position to interpret the law. 
Consequently, leaving interpretation of the law to the court in the context of a motion to 
dismiss satisfies both common sense and precedent. Moreover, petitioner has provided 
no authority for his proposition that, in a motion to dismiss, the court must accept his 
interpretation of the law. The lack of support for his position gives no ground for 
reversal. 
Petitioner's more specific contentions (e.g., that the Board improperly applied 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(8)) fall into these general categories. 
1# 
An examination of the historic facts petitioner purports to challenge shows that the 
district court did not fail to consider them as alleged in the petition. In addressing the 
fact numbered 6 in the district court's decision, R. 305, petitioner correctly points out that 
the federal detainer at R. 169 is dated September 15,1998, not July 27, 2001. However, 
as explained above in n.l, the 1998 detainer was attached by mistake to the memorandum 
supporting respondents' motion to dismiss instead of the 2001 detainer. Despite this 
error, petitioner affirmatively represented in the memorandum supporting his petition that 
"[ejarly 2001, petitioner's federal trial was held, & he was sentenced on July 21, 2001 [,]" 
and that on August 7, 2001, the Board granted him a parole to federal custody, effective 
April 2, 2002, for service of his federal sentence. R. 8-9, f 7.4 From these admissions, 
the court could reasonably infer that a federal detainer had issued, and petitioner does not 
deny that it did. Moreover, at no point has petitioner maintained that the Board 
improperly turned him over to federal authorities for service of his federal sentence. 
Because the clerical error is inconsequential and does not affect the substance of 
petitioner's claims, it cannot serve as the basis for reversal of the district court's decision. 
Petitioner next argues that the facts numbered 7, 8, and 9 in the district court's 
decision establish a false chronology. There is no substance to this claim. In his petition, 
4Although the district court dismissed the original petition without prejudice by order of 
October 22,2007, R. 39, petitioner moved the court to attach the memorandum submitted with 
the original petition, R. 7-32, to the amended petition. R. 77-79. When a response was ordered, 
the memorandum was forwarded to respondents with the amended petition and is, therefore, a 
part of the amended petition. 
II 
petitioner affirmatively represented that he was paroled to federal authorities "as a 
'release' to federal detainer" effective April 2,2002, as stated in fact no. 7. R. 9, f 8; 305, 
% 7. Likewise, the petition states that when the Board granted the April 2, 2002, parole 
date, it "announced its intent to 'toll' petitioner's time while in federal custodyf,]" just as 
fact no. 8 states. R. 9, f 7; 305, f 8. As to fact no. 9, which states that "Petitioner was 
federally tried and convicted of Possession of Child Pornography[,]" R. 305, €|J 9, 
petitioner admits as much in his brief. Aplt. Brief at 4, f 2. He also refers to the federal 
court judgment imposing the federal sentence "signed by Judge Campbell 7/19/2001[,]" 
Aplt. Brief at 19, which shows a 60-month term of incarceration followed by 36 months 
of supervised release, as fact no. 9 reflects. R. 173,305 % 9. 
Petitioner's attack on the facts numbered 11 and 12 is equally unavailing. 
Although he contends that, contrary to fact no. 11, he did not admit to accessing child 
pornography while detained at the federal halfway house, he affirmatively states in the 
memorandum supporting his petition that the halfway house staff found three computer 
disks, one that included his resume, "containing 9 photographs of female children wearing 
swimsuits, and 29 'cartoon' images of children of a pornographic nature[,]ff consistent 
with facts no. 11 and 12. R. 10, f 11. In his brief, he also acknowledges talking to the 
Bonneville Community Correctional Center's treatment team about accessing child 
pornography. Aplt. Brief at 21. Whether the disks were found before or after he spoke 
with the treatment team is irrelevant to the issues on appeal and has no bearing on the 
correctness of the district court's rulings. 
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In short, the district court applied the correct analysis to petitioner's claims. It 
accepted the facts as pleaded, independently analyzed the applicable law, and determined 
that the facts failed to state a claim for relief under the law. Because petitioner has failed 
to show that the court's rulings were dependent on any fact contradicted by the petition, 
he is not entitled to relief on this issue. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT TOLLING 
PETITIONER'S STATE SENTENCE DURING HIS FEDERAL 
INCARCERATION WAS BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND WITHIN 
THE BOARD'S AUTHORITY 
Petitioner maintains that the Board lacked authority to toll his Utah sentence 
during service of the sentence on his federal conviction. He bases his claim on the fact 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(8) (West Supp. 2008), which prohibits crediting an 
offender for time spent in confinement outside the state, was enacted after his conviction 
in 1998, and argues that it cannot be applied retroactively. Petitioner's argument is 
without merit. 
This Court has previously considered whether the Board has the authority to toll a 
Utah sentence during an offender's incarceration by another jurisdiction. In Ontiveros v. 
Utah Board of Pardons, 897 P.2d 1222 (Utah App. 1995), an offender sentenced in 1979 
to an indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years was paroled in 
1987. While on parole, he was arrested for robbery in California and sentenced to four 
years of incarceration. Based on the California offense, the Board found him in violation 
of his parole and required him to serve the balance of his Utah sentence, without credit 
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for time served on the California conviction. The Court concluded that "Appellant's 
imprisonment in California on a different conviction effectively suspended the time for 
the running of his sentence in Utah. Appellant is not entitled to credit for time served in 
California on a new and different conviction." Ontiveros, 897 P.2d at 1224. 
Petitioner's attempt to distinguish Ontiveros is unavailing. First, he asserts that the 
Ontiveros decision is inapplicable because it postdates his conviction by five years. He 
fails to recognize that it applied to a 1979 conviction that, like petitioner's, predated the 
addition of subsection (8) to the statute. The decision was based on the Board's 
"extremely broad amount of discretion 'to determine the period of time that will actually 
be served.'" Ontiveros, 897 P.2d at 1223 (quoting Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961 
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985))). Thus, 
the Court recognized the Board's authority to toll an offender's sentence during service of 
a sentence in another jurisdiction even before that authority was codified in statute. 
Second, petitioner observes that he was already incarcerated on a parole violation when 
he was released to federal authorities, while Ontiveros was not incarcerated, but on parole 
when he was released pursuant to an interstate compact. He does not explain why this 
fact should produce a different outcome. The relevant fact is that petitioner, like 
Ontiveros, was fulfilling a state criminal sentence at the time he was turned over to 
another jurisdiction for service of a sentence imposed by that jurisdiction. It is the 
confinement by a different jurisdiction and on a different crime that "effectively 
14 
suspended the time for the running o f the Utah sentence. Id. at 1224. Ontiveros controls 
here. 
This Court has previously held that petitioner himself is not entitled to credit 
toward his Utah sentence for the time served on his federal crime-and that section 
76-3-202(8) applies to him. In Tucker v. State, 2003 UT App 213, 2003 WL 21469154 
("Tucker T), the Court held that "Petitioner's argument-that time spent incarcerated on 
his federal convictions should simultaneously count towards service of his Utah 
sentence-is entirely without merit." 2003 UT App 213 at *1 . The Court also noted that, 
"[cjontrary to Petitioner's assertions, the language of section 76-3-202(8) does not require 
that Petitioner be 'convicted while on parole' [like Ontiveros] for the provision to apply." 
Id. Although the district court did not rely on this Court's prior decision, it constitutes res 
judicata as to the applicability of the statute, as respondents argued below. See R. 142-44. 
Res judicata comprises two branches, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f 22, 34 P.3d 180 (quotingMaoris & 
Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,1f 19, 16 P.3d 1214). The former "involves the same 
parties and their privies and also the same cause of action, 'and thus precludes the 
relitigation of all issues that could have been raised as well as those that were, in fact, 
litigated in the prior action.'" Id. (quoting Maoris, 2000 UT 93 at f 19). Issue preclusion 
"'arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or their privies from 
relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit.'" 
Id. (quoting Maoris, 2000 UT 93 at f^ 19). As pointed out in the memorandum supporting 
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respondents' motion to dismiss, both branches are implicated in the present case. Tucker I 
involved the identical parties as in the present case: petitioner and the State. The claims 
regarding the Board's authority under the statute are identical to those made in Tucker I, 
which was decided in a final judgment on the merits after being fully and fairly litigated. 
And petitioner could and should have raised his ex post facto argument in Tucker I, but 
failed to do so. As the Court noted in declining to reach that issue, petitioner's challenge 
to ex post facto application of the statute "w[as] not raised in his petition below, and 
Petitioner has not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Therefore, 
we do not address these arguments." 2003 UT App 213 at *1 n.l. 
Even though the district court chose not to grant respondents' motion to dismiss on 
res judicata grounds, "[i[t is well established that an appellate court may affirm a 
judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by 
the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 
1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225 n.2,461 
P.2d 290,293 n.2 (1969)). Because Tucker I established that (1) the Board acted within 
its power in applying section 76-3-202(8) to petitioner, and (2) petitioner could and 
should have raised his ex post facto argument in that case, claim and issue preclusion bar 
him from raising those issues again. The Court may affirm the district court's judgment 
on these record-supported, alternative grounds. 
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As the district court judge took great pains to explain to petitioner, petitioner had 
not completed his Utah sentence when he was paroled to federal custody. See Hrg. DVD 
at 9:16:06 - 9:19:56, 9:23:33 - 9:25:28. While the tolling of his Utah sentence during 
federal custody did delay petitionees ultimate release date as estimated at the time of 
sentencing, it did not increase the total length of time served over the fifteen-year 
maximum ordered by the sentencing court. Under Ontiveros, as subsequently codified in 
statute, his Utah sentence was suspended by virtue of his confinement in another 
jurisdiction. Because he still Mowe[d] a debt of service time" in Utah once his federal 
sentence was completed, R. 307, the district court correctly dismissed this claim, and 
petitioner has failed to show error in that decision. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT A SIGNED 
WARRANT REQUEST WAS APPROPRIATELY CERTIFIED UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-11(3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11 governs revocation of parole. Under the statute, 
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified 
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, 
detain, and return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon arrest or 
otherwise direct the Department of Corrections to determine if there is 
probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his 
parole. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) (West 2004). The word "certified" is defined neither in 
the statute nor in section 77-27-1, which contains the definitions applicable to Chapter 27 
of Title 77. The warrant request in this case was signed by both the agent and his 
supervisor. R. 184. 
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Petitioner's argument on this point attacks the validity of two documents: first, the 
signed request submitted to the Board for a retaking warrant, and second, the district 
court's signed order granting respondents' motion to dismiss. Contrary to petitioner's 
contentions, both documents are validated by the signatures they contain. In addition, 
petitioner's ultimate acceptance of the Board charges, waiver of personal appearance, and 
withdrawal of his request for an evidentiary hearing on the charges acted as a v/aiver of 
all nonjurisdictional defects, including any irregularity in the warrant request. See R. 192; 
see also Alvillar v. Board of Pardons, 2005 UT App 356,2005 WL 2373919 at *2; Bacon 
v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 25, 2006 WL 181523 at *1 . 
In the July 30, 2008 hearing on respondents' motion to dismiss, the district court 
agreed with respondents' counsel that the signatures of the agent and supervisor on the 
warrant request submitted to the Board fulfilled the certification requirement contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) (West 2004). Petitioner argues that the court's conclusion 
to this effect in its order is "a product wholly of the attorney general's imagination and did 
not issue from the court." Aplt. Brief at 3, The order was signed by the judge and 
contains his handwritten, initialed modifications. In light of these facts, petitioner's 
representation is not merely unconvincing, but unsupportable. Moreover, it is 
contradicted by the DVD of the hearing that petitioner successfully moved to have this 
Court incorporate as a part of the record. 
The judge had an extensive exchange with petitioner on the issue of the 
certification requirement after petitioner presented his argument on the point. See Hrg. 
IS 
DVD at 9:08:56 - 9:15:00. In the course of that discussion, the judge referred to 
respondents1 argument that the signatures rendered the warrant request compliant with 
statute, indicating his agreement with it, See Hrg. DVD at 9:11:36 - 9:12:00. Because the 
term "certified" is undefined in statute, the judge declined to impose a technical meaning 
on it, instead construing it in harmony with its ordinary meaning of something given with 
written assurance. He concluded that, as respondents argued, the signatures of the agent 
and supervisor did act as a certification under the statutory language, and that no 
additional formalities, such as notarization, were necessary. 
Petitioner attempts to invoke a Fourth Amendment standard of requiring an oath or 
affirmation with regard to warrant requests. He claims that under Jones v. Utah Board of 
Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 94 P.3d 283, an oath or affirmation is essential to the 
validity of the warrant request, and its absence renders the revocation process 
unconstitutionally defective. Petitioner misreads Jones. In Jones, the Utah Supreme 
Court considered "whether section 77-27-11(3) violates the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, both of 
which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, because it allows for a retaking arrest 
without probable cause." 2004 UT 53 at f 8. The court held that it did not, stating that 
demanding a finding of probable cause before a retaking "would impose requirements on 
section 77-27-11(3) that are not required by either the United States Constitution or the 
Utah Constitution." Id. at f 43. As the court observed, "It is well established that a 
parolee has a more limited right to due process than other citizens," id. at f 45, it 
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concluded that where the Board "may ask the Department of Corrections to determine if 
there is probable cause to detain a parolee, and probable cause must be found in order to 
further detain the parolee, the 'minimal inquiry1 requirements of due process of both the 
Utah and the United States Constitutions are met." Id. at \ 46. 
Even if petitioner were entitled to a warrant request certified by something more 
than the signatures of the agent and supervisor, the district court correctly ruled that the 
claim was waived. In a handwritten letter dated November 16, 2006, petitioner stated:: 
Because I was incorrectly informed as to policy, I mistakenly 
requested on Nov.l an evidentiary hearing before the Board of Pardons. 
Please withdraw that request, and consider this notice as a waiver of 
personal appearance and withdrawal of my denial of violation allegations. 
As stated, I accept the charge of violation, waive personal appearance for 
revocation, and await your decision. 
I am sincerely sorry for any inconvenience this may have caused. 
Thank you. 
R. 192. In a similar case, this Court denied extraordinary relief to a parolee who 
challenged procedural aspects of his revocation but entered an unconditional no contest 
plea to the underlying parole violations. The Court held that "[b]y pleading no contest to 
each violation, [the parolee] waived any claim that he was denied procedural due process 
in the parole revocation proceedings." Alvillar, 2005 UT App 356 at *2; see also Bacon, 
2006 UT App 25 at *1 ("Thus, by pleading guilty to the parole violations, {the parolee] 
waived all nonjurisdictional defects that arose prior to his plea."). The district court judge 
agreed that the claim had been waived both in the hearing and in the subsequent order. 
Hrg. DVD at 9:21:54 - 9:22:07; R. 308. Petitioner has not addressed this conclusion in 
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his brief, but it forms an additional ground for affirmance of the district court's decision as 
to certification of the warrant request. 
V. THE ORDER PREPARED BY RESPONDENTS1 COUNSEL AND 
ISSUED BY THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CORRECTLY STATED 
THE DISTRICT COURTS RULINGS 
Petitioner argues that the drafting of the district court's order by respondents' 
counsel "defies every judicial principle of'due process1" and "creates a gross violation of 
Tucker's due process rights over and above those complained of in his petition." Aplt. 
Brief at 9. Nowhere in his brief does petitioner cite any authority for this novel 
proposition. Moreover, it flies in the face of Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which explicitly requires a prevailing party to prepare a proposed order unless 
directed otherwise by the court. 
Rule 7(f)(2) states: 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with 
an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the 
prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve 
upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's 
decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days 
after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order 
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to 
object. 
An examination of the record shows respondents' full compliance with Rule 7. Eight 
days after the July 30, 2008 hearing, respondents' attorney served a proposed order on 
petitioner. R. 311, mailing certificate. In turn, petitioner filed his objections to the order 
on August 14, 2008. R. 300-03. On August 21, 2008, the district court judge made an 
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initialed modification to the order, recaptioning the "Findings of Fact" as "Factual 
History.M R. 305. He then signed the order as modified, adding under his signature, 
"Objections noted and overruled." R. 310. Had the order not complied with the judge's 
rulings, he had both the opportunity and the obligation to reject or modify it. His 
signature of the modified order adopts it as the order of the court in all respects. As to 
petitioner's contention that the court did not order dismissal with prejudice, Aplt. Brief at 
2, petitioner raised that issue in his objections, R. 302, which were considered and 
rejected by the court. R. 310. Nothing in petitioner's argument on this issue demonstrates 
any deviation from the obligations of Rule 7, and the drafting of the order by respondents' 
counsel consequently provides no basis for relief from the order as signed. 
CONCLUSION 
The substance of petitioner's claim-that the Board of Pardons exceeded its 
authority in tolling petitioner's sentence while he was in federal custody-has previously 
been decided against him by this Court. Although the Court declined to consider the ex 
post facto argument as belatedly raised for the first time on appeal, petitioner could and 
should have raised it at the district court level in that action, and it is barred in the present 
case by res judicata. But even if the Court now chooses to review the claim on the merits, 
petitioner has identified no error in the district court's rulings. Applying the appropriate 
subsection of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B, the district court correctly concluded that the Board's 
actions complied with relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, as reflected in its 
order. Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended petition, the court applied the proper 
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standard to determine that those facts failed fn :;(nfi" .i i (.11111 11111111 "»"., (111. 11, 11• 11vI i ,,in I!i*• 
granted. For these reasons, as explained above, respondents respectfully request the 
( \.ri.- Jecision. 
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Because the issues for decision can be resolved under existing pnwdenl, 
respondents do not seek oral argument. 
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Oeputy 
ana 
1. Onoia . <exual Abuse of a Child and 
sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison. 
2* . C .-.4_fc. . . . villi*«ner was paroled. 
3* On or about December 4, 1995. •'"- r> i •*: -QUU ier, and 
Petitioner was returned to Prison. 
4. On nr nbfMit Mf II I'^ f'i \\ Iilli iiu na;, again iclosed on parole. 
5. On. or about June 12, 1998, the Board issued another retaking warrant was 
.igair h i ,.1 " " ' " 
v •• .i'*out July 27, 2001, a federal det< 
' 7. On or about April 2? 2002, Petitioner was paroled to the federal government for 
disposition of his detainer. 
8. The Board specifically noted that Petitioner's Utah sentence would be ii Ilrd t< u> hv »v v 
% Petitioner was federally tried arid convicted of IVjssessioj. .!' ("In'if I «i -n.t n'uipln He was 
..-__._.. - years in federal prison and three years of supei i• "i I i "lease. 
AV. un vi aoout August 9, ?0(V', I'-i'iii^iiei '.'.'as released Iiom lederal custody and placed in 
the Bonneville Community Correctiunal Center ("BCCC"). 
? 
11. i . -eptember .1L 200b, Petitioner admitted to BCCC staff that he had accessed 
child pornography while at the federal halfway house ;nul ili n In li nl li nii|.>iii .jimm (iiuine* ul )'oung 
girls .** t.ic hade " ' i n 
1,2* Investii :• > - i:. i^ >.A, ; ^ ^ u , iiaii-.vay house and 
discovered computer discs supporting Petitioner's confession. 
juuoner's parole officer's report of these events, the Board again issued a 
retaking wvr* 
: . lough Petitioner initially pled not guilty • • " lating his parole agreement, he later 
wrote a letter to th'1 FVu'i'l IN hi', h (i indu jlnl llui lit" wanted lo withdraw his dtuicn -f the Eolation 
allegations. He also indicated that he accepted responsibility for the violations and v\ i . H '• 
idiiolt in \ in .iiilin»iJ lii .liifig ' ; .. • 
CONCLUSIONS t » ^ 
Ex Post Facto Claim 
Petitioner alleges the ftoiinr\ iln-i'iinn in mil ilii1, 1 lull .saiiencc during his incarceration on 
federal barges incic ..:,:shment beyond what was ordered by the trial coui t, thert'-
* **i ..ga. ^n PX post facto law is one that makes more burdensome the 
punishment for a crime after its commission. Monson v. ('arret °1K f1 ' ' ' '" I ' t»i i <iI, I ,, 
liuifi the United Stale:;) Constitution and the Utah Constitution prohibit ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. 
art I, §10: Utah Cons!, art. ! J \U !. 
3 
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Mi'l, > ,,» 111 • • »• I* -• w\\i i ;<in|i'(| i. (, Jti.il LLi'iu-cli ins Utah sentences had not expired 'Tie Board 
suspended Petitioner's service of I Jtah time and paroled him to fedei 
approximately D^ 1 months on his federal sentence. Petitioner owed a debt of service time on his federal 
crime and he owes a debt of servic k. 
Additionally, although the Utah statute codifying tolling of a Utah sentence during an inmnte's • 
incanvinlion mii 11 n i | HI ii\ch,,„ 111 n «„ l1, a ln-ii lh .:-^!(JJ'(K|, 1I lah Code Ann., took effect in 1997,, the 
Board had such a oolicv in H:u e long before then. See, 
(Utah App. ISJi ., - i — , ^ i i g Board's tolling of Utah sentence !.:• v.y inmate's inc arceiation "• 
California). When Petitioner was a .nority to tah 
sentence during an inmate's incarceration in another jurisdiction and a longstanding pch>v -*] \ nng so. 
Thus lf-r i' lifn ,l M I I - i . 1/ fi | i i
 ( , in in , i« Muid Petitioner s sentence or violate the proir- < 
against ex post facto laws. 
Petitioner has been legally sentenced to one to If -car f' J oancerttion in Utah. The duration of 
his Utah sentence is not increased or madc <• 111 \ i<i tolling of his Utah 
sentence during his federal incarceration 
...a Varrant 
Petitioner challenges the validity of the Board retaking warrant, aHecir.r t!u R. 
11 iiiMiuiiiuijally granted powers when it issued the warrant, that the warrant was not properly certified, 
a n ( l that probable cause was not established. 
3,17 
a constitutional exercise of its authority. Jones v. UtahBd, of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53. 94 P.3d 
I ;s , t r . ud issuance of retaking warrant upon a pidiminary finding of probable cause is 
COnStitUwvyA^Ay. 
Further, there is no requirement that a warrant request be "notarized," only that it be '"certified." 
Toivrlift mum1* '|t|n iiiiliniin in in nun m iiiiiii IIII < i IIIIIII .J test as being true or as 
represented.'"' Black's Law Dictionary 220 (7h ed, 1999). This requirement was luib - .r" 
-r _ ., *A . i^r*c^ UJ,a uuica the document, attesting in ~\; ."'"ng to the truth of v% \ -. 
was being represented. 
Moreover, probable cause was preliminarily established by the "Warrant Request and Parole 
V" , " , : •• ^ " o n " ill i Iin il in iln Hi - ud It I1! m i l in i i>.4h I. . .» . , , i i 
;ly, Petitioner's admission of guilt "waive [d] all non-jurisdictional defects'" inciu<J •. , 
ilul i.ill .HI r regarding probable cause. ."" State v. Parson, 7M P.2d 1275, 1278 ( Utah 
/ vrnrdingly, Petitioner's rights were not violated. 
Petitioner claims hi' ;*ut yi;n;v^^ • V^' ' »• - i'J ,"' d L l:\ .xan'ciaUou beyond the sentence 
-..ggested by the Utah Ser.: **. :ng Guidelines, by his incarceration beyond his alleged ""expiration date," 
.King warrant. 
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The Foi ill (Tilth Amendment of" tin111 tinned States Constitution prohibits any State from depriving 
a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. However, "lawful LIK."'" ™' " '• r7«i 
about the necessa.ry withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and lights, a retraction JUMP :. h\ the 
considerations underlying oui nrnal sv irrn ' wttlni i i iMiNn , 11 I I I - » -K*. , J1 
(1995) (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor I Jnion, Inc, 433 U.S. 119, 1^ 5 (197 IJJ. io 
s s oner must show (I) a liberty interest was implicated and (2) due 
process was not afforded. 
;\ M.i-ner asserts that the .sentencing guidelines establish*HIie 'statutory maximum" snlift in t 
• ihatl could be 'imposed' by thr Bourd hvwd on - ' .'ncing Gimldines, 
however, do not have the force and effect of law, but are merei) oi. ' ^ im^uf ' of the time an inmate 
will be incarcerated. Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 511 (Utah 1994). Petitioner may, in the sole 
discretion of the T 5 ' *een years of his sentence. 
fltj: Is not entitled to release prior to that time. Accordingly, Petitioner does not have a liberty interest in 
icleasc iia/niijiiig n ihu .-tiinin mg guidelines and, iherdoie, lie is not entitled to due process. 
Petitioner also claims hr-: -u^ process rights were violated when his 1 'Lit snitninv «••< 'l/'d 
u'T ... A as in lcu^ral custody, a$ he claims a liberty interest in release on the alleged date *•; 
"expiration." Petitioner, howevei UT-" mni run INYH in inrarn intimi iiiiii MM.1 I HI m Mate Prison
 5iu a 
specific date, but \*as sentenced iw a ix nod of incarceration - one to 15 years. Until Petitioner has 
MI ml I • -;. . ,- . ligation to the State of Utah has not been fulfilled. Any 
Q 11 0 
potential "expimlion diilr," • , ,.; jcct to numerous factors that could change 
the date.. Because Petitionei L,*d *;<; legitimate expectation ui
 jciease on a sp'vifi'' dute im hi i-h, 
inicjt'M aiibcii and nu Jut process is required. . • . • 
Petitioner also claims his du-' ! ' - " ..- seized by the I! Itah 
^—rtment of Corrections upon his release irom federal ..::* • :dv A< discussed, supra, it is wt"li 
;ha! th.'it tin liuiinl lu.s iht i uu.sliluljonal authority to retake parolees, to re\oke parole no :*. h " 
Petitioner's sentence while he is incarcerated on a federal sentence. Accord * 
.vlien he was seized pursuant to the retaking warrant. As discussed above, Petitioner received all of the 
due process to which he was entitled. 
ORDER 
• III* C! )1 \V I I i WWTi )VV I >K IH-.KK, VI JJUJJI ibS AND DECKLES that this action, is . 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUD1CM. 
iKDEREb Ity ilic Lourt this ^/ -udv of August, 2008 
B Y T 1 " " r • • . 
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